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Abstract. This paper introduces a parameterisation of learning algorithms for
distributed constraint optimisation problems (DCOPs). This parameterisation en-
compasses many algorithms developed in both the computer science and game
theory literatures. It is built on our insight that when formulated as noncooper-
ative games, DCOPs form a subset of the class of potential games. This result
allows us to prove convergence properties of algorithms developed in the com-
puter science literature using game theoretic methods. Furthermore, our param-
eterisation can assist system designers by making the pros and cons of, and the
synergies between, the various DCOP algorithm components clear.
1 Introduction
In this paper, we focus on algorithms for distributed constraint optimisation problems
(DCOPs) for use in situations where the actors are distributed and can only commu-
nicate with their peers. Thus, we exclude centralised approaches in which all of the
information needed to solve a problem is accessible to a single decision maker, and
also exclude distributed algorithms that rely on highly structured interactions, such as
algorithmsthatrunonapre-computedtree,becausesuchinteractionsoftenbecomepro-
hibitively costly as the size of the problem increases. We call the remaining algorithms
completely distributed and, broadly speaking, these algorithms can be grouped into two
sets based on their origins: (i) distributed heuristic processes taken from the game the-
ory literature, and (ii) distributed versions of the centralised procedures developed for
traditional constraint optimisation problems from the computer science literature.
Given this context, we show that DCOPs, when viewed from a game theory per-
spective, form a subset of the class of potential games [1], a useful class of games with
several desirable properties. We use this insight to bring together the two sets of algo-
rithms and analyse them under a single framework. In more detail, this paper advances
the state of the art in the following ways. First, we show that DCOP games are a subset
of potential games — a new result which allows us to apply established methods for
analysing algorithms from game theory to existing algorithms produced by the com-
puter science community. Second, we develop a parameterisation that encompasses the
major completely distributed DCOP algorithms. This framework allows us to elucidate
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the relationships between the various algorithms in the form of a parameterisation of the
DCOP algorithm design space. Third, by constructing such a uniﬁed view, we are able
to uncover synergies that arise as a result of combining various approaches. We dis-
cuss the connections between, and overlapping features of, game-theoretic algorithms
and algorithms developed by computer scientists speciﬁcally for solving DCOPs. In the
process, we give two examples of how our parameterisation, guided by the properties
of potential games, can be used to construct novel algorithms in a principled manner.
The paper progresses as follows. In the next section we give an overview of poten-
tial games, introduce DCOPs, and show that DCOP games are a subset of the class of
potential games. Section 3 contains the main contribution of the paper: a parameterisa-
tion of completely distributed algorithms for DCOPs. In Section 4, we show how the
major DCOP algorithms ﬁt our parameterisation, and discuss the connections between
these algorithms. The ﬁnal section concludes and discusses future work.
2 DCOPs as Potential Games
A noncooperative game, hN,{Si,ui}i∈Ni, is comprised of a set of agents N = 1,...,n,
and for each agent i ∈ N, a set of (pure) strategies Si, with ∪N
i=1Si = S, and a utility
function ui : S → R. A joint strategy proﬁle s ∈ S is referred to as an outcome of the
game, where S is the set of all possible outcomes, and each agent’s utility function
speciﬁes the payoff they receive for an outcome by the condition that, if and only if
the agent prefers outcome s to outcome s0, then ui(s) > ui(s0). We will often use the
notation s = {si,s−i}, where s−i is the complimentary set of si.
An agent’s goal is to maximise its own payoff, conditional on the choices of its
opponents.StablepointsinsuchasystemarecharacterisedbythesetofNashequilibria.
Deﬁnition 1 (Nash Equilibrium). A joint strategy proﬁle, s∗, such that no individual
agent has an incentive to change to a different strategy, is a Nash equilibrium:
ui(s∗
i ,s∗
−i)−ui(si,s∗
−i) ≥ 0 ∀ si, ∀ i. (1)
In a Nash equilibrium, no individualagent has an incentiveto change their strategy. This
concept is important because, in general, a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies (prob-
ability distributions over pure strategies) is guaranteed to exist in all ﬁnite games. We
can also deﬁne a strict Nash equilibrium, which is a necessary component of many con-
vergence proofs in game theory, by replacing the inequality in Equation 1 with a strict
inequality. The implication is that in a strict Nash equilibrium, no agent is indifferent
between their equilibrium strategy and another strategy.
The class of potential games is characterised as those games that admit a potential
function on the joint strategy space whose gradient is the gradient of the constituents’
private utility functions [1]. A potential function has a natural interpretation as repre-
senting opportunities for improvement to a player defecting from any given strategy
proﬁle. Thus, the local optima of the potential function are Nash equilibria of the game.
The class of ﬁnite potential games are used to describe many problems in multi-
agent systems, in particular congestion problems on networks [2], and more recently,
power control problems, channel selection problems and scheduling problems in wire-
less networks [3,4], as well as target assignment problems [5] and job scheduling [6].
We now formally deﬁne a potential game.3
Deﬁnition 2 (Potential Games). A function P : S → R is a potential for a game if:
P(si,s−i)−P(s0
i,s−i) = ui(si,s−i)−ui(s0
i,s−i) ∀ si, s0
i ∈ Si ∀ i ∈ N.
A game is called a potential game if it admits a potential.
A potential function is a function of action proﬁles such that the difference induced
by a unilateral deviation equals the change in the deviator’s payoff, and the existence
of a potential function for a game implies a strict joint preference ordering over game
outcomes. This, in turn, ensures that the game possesses two desirable properties.
First, every ﬁnite potential game possesses at least one pure–strategy equilibrium
[2]. To see this, let P be a potential for a game. Then s is an equilibrium point for the
potential game if and only if for every i ∈ N,
P(s) ≥ P(s0
i,s−i) ∀ s0
i ∈ Si.
Consequently, if P admits a maximal value in S (which is true by deﬁnition for a ﬁnite
S), then the game possesses a pure–strategy Nash equilibrium. Now, pure–strategy Nash
equilibrium are particularly desirable in decentralised agent-based systems, as they im-
ply a stable, unique outcome. Mixed strategy equilibria, on the other hand, imply a
probabilistically stable, but stochastically variable strategy proﬁle.
Second, every potential has the ﬁnite improvement property [1]. An improvement
step in a game is a change in one player’s strategy such that its utility is improved. A
path is a sequence of steps, f=(s0,s1,s2...), in which exactly one player changes their
strategy at each step, and fis an improvement path in a gameif for allt,ui(st−1)<ui(st)
for the deviating player i at step t. A game is said to have the ﬁnite improvement prop-
erty if every improvement path is ﬁnite. Now, in a potential game, for every improve-
ment path f = (s0,s1,s2,...) we have, by Deﬁnition 2:
P(s0) < P(s1) < P(s2) < ...
Then, as S is a ﬁnite set, the sequence f must be ﬁnite, so every potential has the ﬁnite
improvement property. The ﬁnite improvement property ensures that the behaviour of
agents who independently play ‘better-responses’ in each period of the repeated game
converges to a Nash equilibrium. Taken together, the two properties discussed above en-
sure that many simple adaptive processes converge to a pure–strategy Nash equilibrium
in a repeated potential game (discussed in Section 4).
We now move on to consider DCOPs, and show that a game-theoretic formulation
ofaDCOPisapotentialgame.Thisisimportantasitallowsustoapplytheconvergence
results noted above to many other algorithms, which, in turn, will allow us to structure
our parameterisation of the DCOP algorithm design space in a principled manner.
A constraint optimisation problem is formally represented by a set of variables
X = {x1,xm,...}, each of which may take one of a ﬁnite number of states or values,
sj ∈ Sj, a set of constraintsC = {c1,c2,...}, and a global utility function, ug, that spec-
iﬁes preferences over conﬁgurations of states of variables in the system. A constraint
c = hXc,Rci is deﬁned over a set of variables Xc ⊂ X and a relation between those vari-
ables, Rc, which is a subset of the Cartesian product of the domains of each variable
involved in the constraint, Õxj∈Xc Sj. A function that speciﬁes the reward for satisfying,4
or penalty for violating, a constraint is written uck(sck), where sck is the conﬁguration of
states of the variables Xck. Using this, the global utility function aggregating the utilities
from satisfying or violating constraints commonly takes the form:
ug(s) = å
ck∈C
uck(s).
Importantly, this aggregation is strictly monotonic, in that an increase in the number
of satisﬁed constraints results in an increase in the global utility. Constraints may be
ascribed different levels of importance by simply weighting the rewards for satisfying
them, or by using a positive monotonic transform of constraint reward [7]. The objective
is then to ﬁnd a global conﬁguration of variable states, s∗, such that:
s∗ ∈ argmax
s ∈ S
ug(s).
Given this, a DCOP is produced when a set of autonomous agents each control the
state of a subset of the variables. A DCOP game is a simple formulation that explicitly
models the strategic dependencies between the variables each agent controls [8]. With-
out loss of generality, we consider the case where each agent controls only one variable,
so we use the terms ‘state of a variable’ and ‘strategy of an agent’ interchangeably. We
notate the set of agents involved in a constraint by Nc, the set of constraints that i is
involved by Ci, and the agents that i shares constraints with, i’s neighbours, by n(i).
ADCOPgameisformulatedbyassigningeachagentaprivateutilityfunction,ui(s),
which is dependent on its own state and the state of other agents in the system. There
is some ﬂexibility in the choice of utility function, however, it is vital that an agent’s
utility only increases when the global solution quality is improved. This is done by
setting each agent’s utility equal to its local effect on the global utility function, which,
in a DCOP, is given by the sum of the payoffs for constraints that agent i is involved in:
ui(s) = å
ck∈Ci
uck(si,sn(i)).
Now, each agent desires to maximise its private utility, and agents are allowed to adjust
their strategies in repeated plays of the game. Distributed solutions to the DCOP are
produced by the independent actions of the agents in the system. Consequently, these
solutions are located at the Nash equilibria of the DCOP game.
We now state the key result we have derived, and upon which the rest of the paper
hinges, placing DCOP games in the class of potential games.
Theorem 1. EverystrictlymonotonicDCOPgameinwhichtheagents’privateutilities
are given by their local effects on the global utility function is a potential game.
Proof. A change in i’s strategy only affects i’s neighbours, n(i), so the following hold:
ui(si,sn(i))−ui(s0
i,sn(i)) = å
ck∈Ci
uck(si,sn(i))− å
ck∈Ci
uck(s0
i,sn(i))
= å
ck∈C
uck(si,s−i)− å
ck∈C
uck(s0
i,s−i)
= ug(si,s−i)−ug(s0
i,s−i),
where the third line ﬂows from the second by deﬁnition. u t5
Thus, ug is an exact potential function for a DCOP game where the agents’ private
utilities are given by their local effects on the value of the global utility function. Con-
sequently, any change in state that increases an agent’s private utility also increases the
global utility of the system.
In the case of binary constraints, the game played between pairs of agents sharing a
constraint can be easily expressed in matrix form. One widely studied binary constraint
optimisation problem is graph colouring. In graph colouring, neighbouring nodes share
constraints, which are satisﬁed if the nodes are in differing states. Consider the follow-
ing graph colouring problem, where each node can be either black or white, and the
associated constraint game:
A B
C
uc(si,sj) =
B W
B (0, 0) (1, 1)
W (1, 1) (0, 0)
In this example, agents A and B each effectively play the game above with agent C,
while agentC plays the composite game below, constructed by combining the constraint
games it plays with each neighbour. In the table on the left below, A and B are column
players and C is the row player, payoffs are (uA, uB, uC). A potential function for the
game is given on the right:
sA, sB B, B B, W W, B W, W
sC B (0, 0, 0) (0, 1, 1) (1, 0, 1) (1, 1, 2)
W (1, 1, 2) (1, 0, 1) (0, 1, 1) (0, 0, 0)
sA, sB B, B B, W W, B W, W
sC B 0 1 1 2
W 2 1 1 0
As the above example shows, complicated payoff structures may be constructed by
combining simple constraint games.
Now that we have shown that DCOP games are potential games, we are assured that
at least one pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists. Furthermore, to prove that the glob-
ally optimal joint proﬁle corresponds to a Nash equilibrium, assume that the optimal
point is not a Nash equilibrium. Then there must be some agent that can alter its state to
improve its utility, which in turn will improve the global utility, which contradicts the
assumption that the optimal point is not a Nash equilibrium. Despite that, we emphasise
that in most cases many Nash equilibria exist, some of which will be sub-optimal.
In the next section we describe the processes by which agents adjust their states
in order to arrive at an equilibrium. However, before continuing, we make one general
comment regarding both the interpretation of the repeated game and the strategy adap-
tation process. We assume that agents suffer from extreme myopia, and do not look
beyond the immediate rewards for taking an action (i.e. they do not consider the stream
of rewards from a series of games), so the only Nash equilibria that are supported are
the Nash equilibria of the one–shot (immediate payoffs) DCOP game.
3 The DCOP Algorithm Design Space
In this section we describe the basic components of many DCOP algorithms present in
the literature. By doing this, we open a way to investigate synergies that arise by com-6
bining seemingly disparate approaches to solving DCOPs. Given an appropriate trigger,
theindividualagentsfollowthe samebasic two–stageroutine.This beginswiththestate
evaluation. Each algorithm has a target function that it uses to evaluate its prospective
states. The target functions are typically functions of payoffs, and sometimes take pa-
rameters that are set exogenously to the system or updated online. This is followed by a
decision on which action to take, based on the preceding state evaluations. The decision
rule refers to the procedure by which an agent uses its evaluation of states to decide
upon an action to take. The system–wide process that controls which agent adjusts its
state at each point in time is given by an adjustment schedule. In many algorithms (par-
ticularly those addressed in the game theory literature), the scheduling mechanism is
left unspeciﬁed, or is implicitly random. However, some algorithms are identiﬁed by
their use of speciﬁc adjustment schedules that allow for preferential adjustment or par-
allel execution. Furthermore, in some cases the adjustment schedule is embedded in the
decision stage of the algorithm. Note that communication does not ﬁgure explicitly in
this framework. Information is communicated between agents for two purposes: (i) to
calculate the value of their target function, or (ii) to run the adjustment schedule. Thus,
the communication requirements of each algorithm depend on these two stages.
Given this background, this section examines the forms that each of the three algo-
rithm stages can take. During this section we will be referring to many algorithms from
the literature on DCOP algorithms and learning in games, the most important being:
Best response (BR) and smooth best response (smBR) [9]; the distributed stochastic al-
gorithm (DSA) [10]; distributed simulated annealing (DSAN) [11]; the maximum–gain
messaging algorithm (MGM) [12,8]; ﬁctitious play (FP) [13] and smooth ﬁctitious play
(smFP) [14,9]; regret matching (RM) [15]; spatial adaptive play (SAP) [16, Chapter
6]; and, the stochastic coordination–2 (SCA–2) and maximum–gain messaging–2 algo-
rithms (MGM–2) [8].
We also note that three signiﬁcant DCOP algorithms — asynchronous partial over-
lay (OptAPO) [17], asynchronous decentralised optimisation (ADOPT) [18] and dy-
namic programming optimisation (DPOP) [19] — are not included in this parametri-
sation.1 Nonetheless, we do refer to techniques used by these algorithms that may be
applied to distributed learning algorithms.
We now discuss the various target functions that are used in DCOP algorithms, and
then examine different decision rules and adjustment schedules used in the algorithms.
3.1 State Evaluations
The way in which a DCOP algorithm searches the solution space is, in the largest part,
guided by the target function used by agents to evaluate their choice of state. The next
subsection addresses using immediate payoffs as a target function, while subsequent
ones examine the more sophisticated alternatives.
Immediate payoff. The simplest target function that a DCOP algorithm can use to
evaluate its strategy is to directly use its private utility function, ui(si,s−i), producing
1 As noted in the introduction, OptAPO is excluded as its proceeds by centralising the DCOP
problem, and so is not comparable to the algorithms included. ADOPT and DPOP are excluded
as they do not use adaptive or learning heuristics, and they rely on a signiﬁcant preprocessing
stage that involves the construction of a depth-ﬁrst search tree on which the algorithm is run.7
typical ‘hill-climbing’ or ‘greedy’ behaviour. This leads the system to a Nash equi-
librium, which corresponds to a local potential–maximising point. Furthermore, many
algorithms, including DSA, DSAN and MGM, use the amount to be gained by changing
state as a target function. This is a simple perturbation of the utility function, and for
many decision rules, using either the gain or the raw utility function as an input will
produce the same result.
Agents using this target function to update their state evaluations only need to ob-
serve the current state of their neighbours to run the algorithm, and do not need to
communicate any further information. However, the use of such a target function can
often result in slow convergence.
Expected payoff over historical frequencies. In order to speed up convergence, an
algorithm can use the expected payoff for each state over historical frequencies of state
proﬁles as a target function. In this case, let i’s belief over its opponents’ joint strategy
proﬁles, qt
i(s−i), be given by the frequency with which it observes each joint proﬁle.
Each agent’s expected payoff given this belief, written FPt
i, is then:
FPt
i =å
S−i
qt
i(s−i)ui(si,s−i).
This target function can be speciﬁed recursively, which only requires agents to maintain
a measure of the expected payoff for each state, rather than the full action history:
FPt
i = 1/t
£
ui(si,st
−i)+(t −1)FPt−1
i
¤
,
where ui(si,st
−i) is i’s payoff for each element of Si given its opponents’ proﬁle at t.
FP and smFP use this measure of expected payoff as a target function. It has the
same communication requirements as algorithms that use the immediate payoff as a
target function, because at each point in time each agent only needs to know the values
of ui(si,s−i) for each of its states. Variations of ﬁctitious play that use other meth-
ods to update the agent’s belief state have been suggested, such as cautious ﬁctitious
play, for situations where an agent can only observe its payoff and so uses the average
received payoff to each action [20], or weighted ﬁctitious play, for highly variable envi-
ronments,inwhich pastobservations’contributiontoan agent’sbelief areexponentially
discounted [21].
Average regret for past actions. Another approach that can be used to speed up con-
vergence is to measure the average ‘regret’ for not taking an action, written ARt
i, where
regret is the difference in payoff for choosing a state and the state that was actually
chosen at a particular time:
ARt
i =
1
t
t
å
t=1
[ui(si,st
−i)−ui(st
i,st
−i)] (2)
This target function is also known as external regret. Like the measure of expected
payoff discussed above, the average regret target function can be speciﬁed recursively,
only requiring the agents to maintain a measure of average regret for each state:
ARt
i = 1/t
£
ui(si,st
−i−ui(st)+(t −1)ARt−1
i )
¤
.8
This target function is used by [15] to construct the RM algorithm, and is generalised
to characterise an entire class of adaptive strategies [22]. It is also used as the target
function for a distributed simulated annealing method for ﬁnding the Nash equilibria
of games [23]. Average regret uses the same observations as algorithms that use the
immediate payoff or expected payoff for an action as a target function. Like ﬁctitious
play, many variations of the method of updating regrets have been suggested. For ex-
ample, a variation of the average regret measure, for situations where an agent can only
observe its own payoff, is known as internal regret [24]. This method calculates regret
as the difference between the average payoff for choosing each state in the past and the
received payoff for the state selected at a particular time. Another example is a target
function with exponentially discounted regrets [5].
Aggregated immediate payoffs. One inconvenient aspect of the above target function
speciﬁcations is that they are prone to converging to suboptimal equilibria (in the ab-
sence of some probabilistic decision rule, as will be discussed in Section 3.2). A number
of algorithms avoid this problem by using aggregated payoffs to evaluate states. These
algorithms have signiﬁcantly increased communication requirements, because agents
pass information regarding the value of each state, rather than just indicating the cur-
rent state of their variables.
MGM–2 and SCA–2 both use a pairwise aggregate of local utility functions to eval-
uate the joint state of two neighbouring agents, i and j:
uij = ui(si,sjs−i,j)+ui(si,sj,s−i,j) (3)
This allows the agents to synchronise their state changes, and can be used to avoid the
worst Nash equilibria in the system by converging only to 2–optima. In general, a k–
optimum is a strategy proﬁle that is stable in the face of deviations of all coalitions of
size k and less. In [25], the worst–case k–optimum solution to a DCOP game is shown
to be better than the worst–case (k-1)–optimum. This result implies that an algorithm
that uses a pairwise aggregated target function has a higher lower–bound on its solution
than any algorithm that only converges to a Nash equilibrium.
Furthermore,[8]proposetwofamiliesofk–coordinatedalgorithms—themaximum–
gain messaging–k and stochastic coordination–k algorithms — that use locally aggre-
gated utilities for coalitions of k agents, which each converge to an element of their
respective set of k–optima. However, although the number of messages communicated
at each step to calculate the aggregated utilities increase linearly with the number of
neighbours each agent has, the size of each message increases exponentially with the
size of the coalitions. These factors make constructing algorithms that aggregate the
utilities of large coalitions of agents infeasible.
3.2 Decision Rules
Adecisionruleistheprocedurethatanagentusestomaptheoutputofitstargetfunction
to its choice of strategy. The decision rule used by most DCOP algorithms is either the
argmax or argmin functions, or probabilistic choice functions. We now consider these
rules in more detail.9
Argmaxandargmindecisionrules. Theargmaxfunction(or,equivalently,theargmin
function) returns the state with the highest (lowest) valued target function. If two or
more states achieve the same maximum value, typically one is chosen with equal prob-
ability. However, in the case that one of those states is the current state, most imple-
mentations maintain that state and do not randomise. In this case, an algorithm using
the immediate reward as a target function will sometimes converge to a Nash equilib-
rium that is not strict. In the other case, a similar algorithm would only ever converge
to a strict Nash equilibrium.
A beneﬁt of using the argmax function in conjunction with an immediate reward
target function is that the resulting algorithm usually converges quickly, and depending
on speciﬁcs, may even be anytime (e.g. MGM). However, one drawback of this tech-
nique is its dependence on initial conditions. It is quite possible that the initial random
conﬁguration of states places the system outside the basin of attraction of an optimal
Nash equilibrium, meaning that an algorithm using the argmax decision rule can never
reach an optimal point. To avoid this scenario, a probabilistic decision rule may be used
instead. On the other hand, adding ergodicity to an algorithm by using a probabilis-
tic decision rule allows it to escape from the basin of attraction of a sub-optimal Nash
equilibrium (or local maximum of the potential function), but at the cost of sometimes
degrading the solution quality and usually increasing the convergence time.
Linear probabilistic decision rules. The linear probabilistic decision rule produces a
mixed strategy with probabilities in direct proportion to the target value of each state:
Psi =
ui(si,st
−i)
å
si∈Si
ui(si,st
−i)
.
This model is only appropriate when the target function supplies a non-negative input.
For example, RM uses the linear probabilistic choice function with negative regrets set
equal to zero, so that they are chosen with zero probability [15]. However, in general,
this is quite a substantial limitation which limits the applicability of the linear proba-
bilistic choice rule.
Multinomial logit decision rules. One probabilistic decision rule that can accept neg-
ative input is the multinomial logit decision rule or Boltzmann distribution [26]:
Psi(h) =
eh−1ui(si,st
−i)
å
si∈Si
eh−1ui(si,st
−i).
Here states are chosen in proportion to their reward, but their relative probability is
controlled by h, a temperature parameter. If h = 0 then the argmax function results,
while h = ¥ produces a uniform distribution across strategies, which results in the state
of the system following a random walk. Depending on the speciﬁcs of the problem at
hand, the temperature can be kept constant or may be decreased over time. The later
case is referred to in the online reinforcement learning literature as a ‘greedy in the
limit with inﬁnite exploration’ decision rule [27]. This decision rule is used in typical
speciﬁcations of smBR, SAP and smFP.10
Simulated annealing decision rules. The simulated annealing decision rule is a proba-
bilistic decision rule that works by randomly selecting a new candidate state and accept-
ing or rejecting it based on a comparison to the current state [28,29]. All improvements
in the target function are accepted, while states that lower the value of the target func-
tion are only accepted in proportion to their distance from the current state’s value.
For example, the case where the target function is given by the agent’s private utility
function gives the following decision rule:
Psi(h) =
½
1 if ui(si,s−i) ≥ ui(j,s−i)
eh−1(ui(j,s−i)−ui(si,s−i)) else
where ui(j,s−i) is the current state’s payoff. As with the multinomial logit choice
model, h is a temperature parameter. If h = 0 then only states that improve the tar-
get function are accepted, while if h = ¥ all candidate states are accepted, and the state
of the system follows a random walk. The temperature may be kept constant, result-
ing in an analogue of the Metropolis algorithm [28], or may be decreased over time as
in a standard simulated annealing optimisation algorithm [29]. This rule is used in the
DSAN algorithm, and a simulated annealing algorithm based on average regret has been
suggested as a computational technique for solving for the Nash equilibria of general
games [23].
3.3 Adjustment Schedules
An adjustment schedule is the mechanism that controls which agents adjusts their state
at each point in time. The simplest schedule is the ‘ﬂood’ schedule, where all agents ad-
just their strategies at the same time. Beyond this, adjustment schedules can be divided
into two groups: random or deterministic. The former are typically run by each agent
independently, and can produce sequential or parallel actions by agents. The latter often
require agents to communicate information between themselves in order to coordinate
which agent adjusts their strategy at a given point in time.
Flood schedule. Under the ﬂood schedule, all agents adjust their strategies at the same
time. It is frequently used in applications of local greedy algorithms, and in DSAN, FP
and smFP. A problem commonly observed with algorithms using the ﬂood schedule,
particularly greedy algorithms, is the presence of ‘thrashing’ or cycling behaviour [6].
Thrashing occurs when, as all agents adjust their states at the same time, they inadver-
tently move their joint state to a globally inferior outcome. Furthermore, it is possible
that a set of agents can become stuck in a cycle of adjustments that prevents them from
converging to a stable, Nash equilibrium outcome. In theory, the potential for these
types of behaviours to occur means that convergence cannot be guaranteed, while in
practice they can be detrimental to the performance of any algorithm using the ﬂood
schedule.
Parallel random schedules. Parallel random adjustment schedules are simply vari-
ations of the ﬂood schedule, in which each agent has some probability p of actually
changing their state at any time step. As such, the parameter p is known as the degree
of parallel executions [6]. These types of adjustment schedules do not ensure that no11
thrashing takes place, but by selecting an appropriate value of p, or decreasing p along
an appropriate schedule, thrashing and cycling behaviour can be minimised, producing
an algorithm with parallel execution without increased communicational requirements.
This is the adjustment schedule used by DSA and RM.
Sequential random schedules. The group of adjustment schedules that we call se-
quential random schedules involve randomly giving one agent at a time the opportunity
to adjust its strategy, with agents selected by some probabilistic process. The motiva-
tion for using this adjustment schedule is the ﬁnite improvement property of potential
games, which directly implies that agents who play a sequence of ‘better responses’
converges to a Nash equilibrium in a ﬁnite number of steps. This property is used to
prove the convergence of SAP and a sequential–move version of ﬁctitious play [30].
Now, sequential procedures do not allow for the parallel execution of algorithms in
independent subgraphs, where thrashing is not a concern, or for the execution of algo-
rithms whose convergence can be guaranteed without asynchronous moves. However,
they do ensure that agents’ do not cycle or thrash, which is a risk with using the ﬂood
or parallel random adjustment schedules.
Maximum–gain priority adjustment schedule. The MGM algorithm takes its name
from the type of adjustment schedule it uses [8,12]. This preferential adjustment proto-
colinvolvesagentsexchangingmessagesregardingthemaximumgaintheycanachieve.
If an agent can achieve the greatest gain out of all its neighbours, then it implements
that change, otherwise it maintains its current state. The maximum–gain messaging ad-
justment schedule avoids thrashing or cycling, as no two neighbouring agents will ever
move at the same time.
Constraintpriorityadjustmentschedule. Asecondpreferentialadjustmentschedule,
the constraint priority adjustment schedule, works by allocating each agent a priority
measure based on the number of violated constraints it is involved with. This is the type
of adjustment schedule used by the OptAPO algorithm.
4 DCOP Algorithm Parametrisation
In this section we show how many well known algorithms ﬁt our parameterisation.
Table 1 shows the parameterisation of seven main DCOP algorithms, which clearly
shows the relationships between the algorithms, in terms of the components used to
construct each algorithm.
Building in this, we give two examples of how the properties of potential games
can be used to construct convergence proofs for several algorithms that share common
components. First, we consider local best–response algorithms, which use the immedi-
ate reward as a target function and the argmax decision rule. In comparing two such al-
gorithms, DSA and MGM, we highlight how small differences can affect an algorithm’s
properties, and clearly demonstrate the beneﬁts of a potential game characterisation
of DCOPs. We also show how our parameterisation can be used to develop novel al-
gorithms, by introducing a hybrid algorithm based on SAP. Second, we examine the
ﬁctitious play family of algorithms, which use the expected payoff over historical fre-
quencies of actions as a target function, and show how our parameterisation allows for
a straightforward generalisation of this family of algorithms.12
Target Function Memory Decision Rule Adjustment Sched.
DSA ui(s) — argmax Parallel random (p)
MGM ui(s) — argmax Preferential:
Maximum Gain
FP 1
t
t
å
t=1
ui(si,st
−i) Expected values argmax Flood
RM 1
t
t
å
t=1
·
ui(si,st
−i)
−ui(st
i,st
−i)
¸
Regret values linear probabilistic Parallel random (p)
SAP ui(s) — logistic Sequential random
DSAN ui(s) — sim. annealing Parallel random (p)
smBR ui(s) — logistic Flood
smFP 1
t
t
å
t=1
ui(si,st
−i) Expected values logistic Flood
SCA–2 ui(s)+uj(s) — argmax Parallel random (p)
MGM–2 ui(s)+uj(s) — argmax Preferential:
Maximum Gain
Table 1: Parameterisation of the main DCOP algorithms
4.1 Local Best–Response Algorithms
We begin by considering DSA and MGM, both of which use the immediate payoff for an
action as their target function and the argmax function for their decision rule. They dif-
fer purely by the adjustment schedule they employ: DSA uses a random parallel sched-
ule, and MGM a maximum–gain preference schedule. This difference affects the con-
vergence properties of the algorithms. In more detail, MGM converges to a Nash equi-
librium and is an anytime algorithm in potential games. This is because when agents
act in isolation, their actions only ever improve their own utility, which implies an im-
provement in global utility (by Equation 2), and, by the same reasoning, the ﬁnite im-
provement property ensures that this algorithm converges to a Nash equilibrium in ﬁnite
time.2 However, DSA is not anytime, as it is possible for agents that change state at the
same time to ﬁnd themselves in a worse state than they began in, nor does it converge
in ﬁnite time. Nonetheless, we can show the following, weaker,3 convergence result:
Theorem 2. The distributed stochastic algorithm almost surely converges to a Nash
equilibrium in repeated potential games.
Proof. Sketch: A Nash equilibrium is an absorbing strategy proﬁle under the DSA’s
dynamics; that is, once in a Nash equilibrium, no agent will change their strategy. Now,
2 In [8], MGM is shown to converge to an element in the set of Nash equilibrium and to be any-
time in DCOP games directly, without using a potential game characterisation of the problem.
3 Almost sure convergence is a weaker form of convergence than ﬁnite time convergence, as at
any point in time the system can be arbitrarily far from an equilibrium strategy proﬁle.13
for any non–Nash equilibrium outcome, there exists a longest improvement path, of
length M, that terminates at a Nash equilibrium. In a game consisting of N agents using
DSA to adapt their state, for any probability of updating p ∈ (0,1), the probability that
only one agent changes state at a particular time step is given by: p(1− p)N−1. Now,
the probability that, at some time step, the selected agent is able to improve its utility is
at least p(1− p)N−1/N, which is its value when the improvement step is unique. Then,
at any time, the probability of traversing the longest improvement path of length M, is
at least: ·
p(1− p)N−1
N
¸M
The proof is completed by using a geometric distribution to show that as t → ¥, the
probability that a complete worst–case improvement path is traversed goes to 1. u t
Asimilarconvergenceproofcanbederivedforanovelhybridalgorithmconstructed
by replacing the multinomial logit decision rule of SAP with the argmax function,
which we call greedy spatial adaptive play. By the ﬁnite improvement property, greedy
spatial adaptive play almost surely converges to a Nash equilibrium in potential games,
because, as with DSA, the probability that a complete worst–case improvement path is
completed goes to 1 as t → ¥.
4.2 The Fictitious Play Family of Algorithms
The term ‘ﬁctitious play’ is often used to denote a family of adaptive processes which
use the expected payoff over historical frequencies of actions as a target function. This
family signiﬁcantly generalise the standard ﬁctitious play algorithm [31]. The tradi-
tional version of ﬁctitious play, described in Table 1 as FP, uses the ﬂood schedule, so
agents adjust their state simultaneously. Regarding FP, a proof of the convergence of
this algorithm to Nash equilibrium in potential games is given by [32]. Additionally, a
sequential–move version of ﬁctitious play also converges to Nash equilibrium in non-
degenerate potential games4 [30]. In more detail, in repeated potential games, these
algorithms converges in beliefs; that is, each agent’s estimate of its opponents’ strate-
gies, which is used to calculate each of its own strategy’s expected payoff, converges as
time progresses.
Furthermore, any algorithm that uses historical frequencies as a target function and
the argmax decision rule (regardless of the adjustment schedule used) has the property
that if play converges to a pure–strategy proﬁle, it must be a Nash equilibrium, because
if it were not some agent would eventually change their strategy. Additionally, strict
Nash equilibria are absorbing; if a strict Nash equilibrium is played once it is played
from then on [9]. These results imply that the adjustment schedule is of little importance
to the behaviour of algorithms in the ﬁctitious play family, and so can be freely selected
to best suit the situation at hand.
4 For our purposes, a non-degenerate game satisﬁes the condition that, for every i ∈ N and for
every s−i ∈ S−i:
ui(s0
i,s−i) 6= ui(s00
i ,s−i).
That is, for any pure strategy proﬁle of his opponents, an agent’s best response correspondence
contains only one strategy.14
5 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we focus on completely distributed algorithms for DCOPs. Our key con-
tribution is a parameterisation of completely distributed algorithms for DCOPs, which
captures many algorithms developed in both the computer science and game theory
literatures. This parameterisation is built on our insight that when formulated as non-
cooperative games, DCOPs form a subset of the class of potential games. In turn, this
allows us to apply game theoretic methods to analyse algorithms developed in the com-
puter science literature. In Section 3 we showed how many existing algorithms ﬁt our
parameterisation. Then, in Section 4, we showed how they can be analysed using results
concerning potential games, and also give two examples of how our parameterisation
can be used to construct novel algorithms in a principled manner.
In [33], we extend this research by empirically comparing many of the algorithms,
both hybrids and existing algorithms, considered in this paper. The experiments re-
ported in that work examine the trade–offs between solution quality, convergence time
and communication requirements for using different DCOP algorithm components.
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